The reference class problem in probability theory and the multiple inheritances (extensions) problem in non-monotonic logics can be referred to as special cases of con icting beliefs. The current solution accepted in the two domains is the speci city priority principle. By analyzing an example, several factors (ignored by the principle) are found to be relevant to the priority of a reference class. A new approach, Non-Axiomatic Reasoning System (NARS), is discussed, where these factors are all taken into account. It is argued that the solution provided by NARS is better than the solutions provided by probability theory and non-monotonic logics.
Introduction
How d o w e predict whether an individual has a certain property, if direct observation is impossible? A useful method is to look for a \reference class". The class should include the individual as an instance, and we should know something about how often the instances of the class have the desired property, or whether its typical instances have it. Then, the prediction can be done by letting the instance \inherit" the information from the class.
In the eld of reasoning under uncertainty, there are (at least) two paradigms that use this type of inference: non-monotonic logics (for example, Touretzky's inheritance network in 15]), and probabilistic reasoning systems (for example, Pearl's Bayesian network in 9]).
In non-monotonic logics, if the only relevant knowledge is \A is an instance of R" and \Normally, R's instances have the property Q", a defeasible conclusion is \A has the property Q".
In probabilistic reasoning systems, under the subjective i n terpretation of probability, if the only relevant knowledge is \A is an instance of R" and \The probability f o r R's instances to have the property Q is p", a plausible conclusion would be \The probability for A to have the property Q is p".
Now a problem appears: if A belongs to two classes R 1 and R 2 at the same time, and the two classes lead to di erent predictions about whether (or how probable) A has the property Q, what conclusion can we r e a c h? In di erent c o n text, the problem is referred to as \multiple inheritance problem", \multiple extension problem", or \reference class problem" 3, 6 , 7 , 9 , 1 0 , 1 1 , 1 5 ] .
Though the above theories treat the problem di erently, they have something in common: None of them suggest a general solution to the problem, though they agree on a special case: if R 2 is a (proper) subset of R 1 , R 2 is the correct reference class to be used.
Let us see two examples.
1. In 15], Touretzky said: \Since Clyde is a royal elephant, and royal elephants are not gray, Clyde is not gray. On the other hand, we could argue that Clyde is a royal elephant, royal elephants are elephants, and elephants are gray, so Clyde is gray. Apparently there is a contradiction here. But intuitively we feel that Clyde is not gray, e v en though he is an elephant, because he is a special type of elephant: a royal elephant." 2. In 6], Kyburg said: \If you know the survival rate for 40-year old American male to be 0.990, and also that the survival rate for 40-year old American male white-collar workers to be 0.995, then, other things being equal, it is the latter that should constrain your beliefs and enter your utility calculations concerning the particular 40 year old male white-collar worker John Smith." Let us call this principle \speci city p r i o r i t y principle". It looks quite reasonable, and it is not hard to nd many examples to show t h a t w e do apply such a principle in common sense reasoning. However, the following questions are still open:
1. Why is the principle correct? Can it be justi ed by more basic axioms or assumptions? 2. Beside speci city, what are the \other things" that in uence the priority of a reference class? 3. When neither reference class is more speci c than the other, what should be done? For the rst question, Reichenbach made it a matter of de nition by \regarding the individual case as the limit of classes becoming gradually narrower and narrower" 11] Pearl said it is because \the in uence of the remote ancestors is summarized by the direct parents " 9] .
For the second question, Reichenbach said we n e e d t o h a ve complete statistical knowledge on the reference class, that is, the probability f o r R to be Q should be supported by good statistical data 11]. In non-monotonic logics, this corresponds to su cient evidence which can determine what properties a normal instance of the class has. For the third question, few word is said, except Reichenbach's suggestion to \look for a larger number of cases in the narrowest common class at your disposal " 11] .
Dissatis ed by the above answers, this paper is an attempt to discuss the issue of reference class in more detail. An example, with its variations, will be discussed as a starting point, then, after analyzing the factors that in uence the result, the solution provided by Non-Axiomatic Reasoning System (NARS) 16, 17, 18] is discussed and compared with the speci city p r i o r i t y principle.
A thought experiment
Let us reconstruct Kyburg's example in the following way: Imaging that you are working for a life insurance company, and you need to predict whether John Smith can live t o 4 0 . Y ou have John's personal information, and for some special reasons (such a s y ou just woke up from a 200-year-long sleep or you are actually an extraterrestrial spy), you have n o b a c kground knowledge about the survival rates at 40 for various groups of people. Fortunately, y ou have access to personal les of some Americans, who are alive o r d i e d i n r e c e n t y ears, and you decide to make the prediction by the \reference class method" de ned above.
At rst, knowing that John is a male, you begin to build the rst reference class R 1 by picking up some les randomly. R 1 consists of two subsets: P 1 problem: to see John as a \male" and a \male white-collar worker" will lead to di erent predictions.
If we apply the speci city priority principle here, the result should be dominated by R 2 , since \male white-collar worker" is a proper subset of \male". However, it is easy to nd a situation to show that sometimes the result is counter-intuitive. If you have l o o k ed through 1000 les, and all of them are males and live to 40, and after that you nd 1 male white-collar worker who died at 35, will you predict that John will die before 40? It seems very unlikely. Does this mean that the speci city priority principle is wrong? Of course not. Sample size is obviously one of the \other things" that in uence the priority of a reference class. One sample is far from enough to tell us about how a \ t ypical" or \normal" instance looks like, or to support a statistical assertion on the instances. In such a case, the principle is inapplicable, since there is another relevant di erence between the two reference classes, beside their speci cities.
If you have t o m a k e predictions in such a n e n vironment, what will you do? Let us consider a simple psychological experiment. Assuming R 1 includes positive evidence only (that is, R 1 = P 1 , no male is found to be died before 40), but R 2 includes negative evidence only (that is, R 2 = N 2 , no male white-collar worker is found to be alive a t 4 0 ) . E v en before really carrying out such a n experiment o n h uman subjects, We are con dent t o m a k e the following prediction: If jP 1 j is xed at a big number (say 1000), and jN 2 j is increased one by one, starting from 1, the predictions made by subjects will be positive before jN 2 j reaching a certain point, and negative after reaching that point. That critical point m a y v ary from person to person, but is always smaller than jP 1 j.
The \sample size e ect" can also be used to answer the following question: If a more speci c reference class is always better, why d o n o t w e simply use the most speci c reference c l a s s , de ned by all available properties of John Smith? The reason is simple: in most situations such a class is empty | nobody is similar to John to such a n e x t e n t. With more and more properties used to de ne a reference class, the extension of the class becomes narrower and narrower. As a result, fewer and fewer samples can be found to support the prediction or to against it. From this point of view, speci city is not preferred.
Previously, w e t a l k ed about the reference classes R 1 and R 2 , as if they are accurately de ned.
Obviously it is a simpli cation. Though we can ignore the boundary cases for \male", the fuzziness in \white-collar worker" cannot be neglected so easily. As argued by fuzzy set theory 19] a n d prototype theory 13], whether an instance belongs to a concept is usually a matter of degree. This membership function is also related to the current issue: if John can be referred to as a \white-collar worker", but not a typical one, the in uence of R 2 will be reduced.
How should we empirically determine the membership function for a concept like \white-collar worker"? Psychologists suggest that it can be determined by the degree of similarity of the instance to a prototype 13] o r a n exempli er 8] of the concept. A common way to determine the similarity between two concepts is to compare their properties. Like the situation of probability prediction, similarity e v aluation is also in uenced by t wo factors: the proportion of shared properties and the amount of properties that has been checked during the evaluation. As a result, we can predict that the more properties an instance and a reference class shares, the higher the priority of the class is.
Analysis of the factors
In the previous section, some factors are listed which in uence the priority of a reference class. Let us summarize them formally as the following: To predict whether A has property Q, t wo reference classes R 1 and R 2 are taken into consideration. If we w r i t e \ A has property Q" a s A 2 Q, \ A is a member of R" a s A 2 R, and \R's members have property Q" a s R Q, the problem becomes: to evaluate (to predict its truth value or probability) T 0 : A 2 Q from the given evaluations of T 1 : A 2 R 1 T 2 : A 2 R 2 T 3 : R 1 Q T 4 : R 2 Q:
How should we e v aluate each of the above statements? As discussed in the previous section, we can see two major factors that need to be measured: one is the frequency or proportion of the positive evidence among all relevant evidence, and the other is the total amount of evidence that have been considered. In the following discussion, we will refer to the weight of positive, negative, and total evidence for T i as w + In traditional binary logic, as used in set theory, the result is straightforward. Under the assumption of complete knowledge, there are only two t ypes of statements: a rmative and negative, where either w + i = w i or w ; i = w i . Such a system is monotonic in the sense that the evaluation of statements are insensitive to new knowledge, that is, w i is constant for all statements. In this situation, the reference class problem cannot appear: given the consistency of the premises, the conclusions derived along di erent paths cannot con ict with each other.
However, problems emerge as soon as we allow general rules (as T 3 and T 4 ) t o h a ve exceptions, and to allow the accommodation of new evidence. If T 3 is such a rule, from the fact that T 1 is true, we can no longer guarantee the truthfulness of T 0 , since A may turn out to be an exception. On the other hand, since A is not necessarily included in w 3 , T 0 is not necessarily true even if T 3 has no available negative evidence. Returning to the previous example: if the current survival rate is 1 for males at the age of 40, it does not follow that John Smith (currently 20 years old) cannot die before 40, because the \rule" may h a ve potential negative evidence which is not available at present.
In such a situation, how can the \reference class method" be justi ed? It can be derived from a more fundamental principle: the extension (instances) and intension (properties) of a concept is co-ordinated during the development o f h uman classi cation behavior 4]. As a result, we can predict extensional relations from intensional relations (e.g., to determine whether a concept includes an instance by c hecking the properties of the concept), and to predict intensional relations from extensional relations (e.g., to determine whether a concept has a property b y c hecking the instances of the concept).
However, with insu cient knowledge and resources, the co-ordination between extension and intension is imperfect, that means (1) the statements usually have both positive and negative evidence, and (2) the current e v aluations should be revised according to future evidence.
When two (or more) competing evaluations (about the same statement, but based on di erent sources of evidence) are taken into consideration at the same time, there are two possibilities:
1. The evidence that support them is uncorrelated, that is, they come from independent sources. Therefore, the two pieces of evidence should be combined, since the weight of evidence is an additive measurement. As a result, the frequency of the result is a weighted sum of the frequencies of the competing evaluations, and the weight of the result is the sum of the weights of the competing evaluations (see the following section). Obviously, b e t ween the two competing evaluations, the one with a larger weight should have a stronger in uence on the result. 2. The two competing evaluations are based on correlated evidence, when some evidence has been used to supporting both evaluations. In such a case, the two pieces of evidence should not be combined by addition. If the system has to make a decision without the help of other information about how the evidence is correlated, the evaluation with a larger weight should be chosen, since it is supported by more evidence, and the other is ignored.
Since in both cases the evaluation with a larger weight has a priority o ver the other one, let us see how the weight is determined. Intuitively, to get a large weight f o r T 0 (\A has property Q"), using R 1 as the reference class, both T 1 and T 3 must have large weights, that means, there should be enough evidence to support the evaluation for \A is a member of R" and \R's members have property Q". As discussed in the previous section, for T 1 it means that R 1 is intensionally described by a large set of properties (shared by A), and for T 3 it means that R 1 is extensionally exempli ed by a large set of instances (shared by Q).
Since a more speci c concept is always described by more properties than a more general concept, the former has a priority, other things being equal. However, when there is a sample size di erence or typicality di erence which f a vors the more general concept, the speci city priority c a n be more or less cancelled out. This conclusion from above analysis is consistent with the result of the thought experiment in the previous section.
Another approach
Non-Axiomatic Reasoning System (NARS) 16, 1 7 , 18] is an intelligent system which w orks and adapts to its environment under the assumption of insu cient k n o wledge and resources. As a result of the assumption, it also meets the reference class problem.
For our current purpose, let's say t h a t e a c h statement in NARS has the form of S P or S 2 P, where S is the subject term, a n d P the predicate term. Since S 2 P can be identically rewritten as fSg P, w e will talk only about the rst form in the following.
Intuitively speaking, either a common instance or a common property of S and P is counted as a piece of positive evidence for S P, w i t h a unit weight, that is, w = w + = 1. On the contrary, either an instance of S which is not shared by P or a property o f P which is not shared by S is counted as a piece of negative evidence for S P, with a unit weight, that is, w = w ; = 1 . F or a formal de nition of evidence and its weight, see 17] .
In NARS, the truth value of a statement, indicating how the statement is supported by a vailable evidence, is represented by a pair of real numbers in 0, 1], < f c > , where f is w + w , the relative frequency of positive evidence, and c is the con dence. Con dence is de ned in NARS as w w+k , a monotonic increasing function of total weight, indicating the stability of the current frequency evaluation. k, a positive c o n s t a n t, is assumed to be 2 in this paper. It is easy to see that given the de nition of truth value in terms of weight of evidence, we can also calculate the latter from the former.
NARS can carry out several types of inference on judgments (i.e., statements with truth value). In this paper, only three of them are mentioned: updating, revision and deduction.
The updating rule and the revision rule are used to deal with con icting evidence. We assume that the system has a pair of judgments which are about the same statement: J 1 : S P < f 1 c 1 > and J 2 : S P < f 2 c 2 > At rst, the system needs to check whether the judgments are based on correlated evidence. This can be done somehow in NARS (see 17]), and a \Yes/No" result is reported. As discussed before, if the evidence of the two judgments is not correlated, an evidence combination, or revision, should be done. For the revised judgment, its weight of total, positive, and negative evidence should be the sum of the corresponding weights of J 1 and J 2 . G i v en the relations between weight and truth value, it is easy to get the truth value of the revised judgment S P < f 0 c 0 >: f 0 = w 1 f 1 + w 2 f 2 w 1 + w 2 c 0 = w 1 + w 2 w 1 + w 2 + k 1. When 0 < n < 4, R 1 is selected. The speci city p r i o r i t y o f R 2 is undermined by the fact that the sample size of R 2 is too small. 2. When n 4, R 2 is selected. The speci city p r i o r i t y can be established even by a pretty small sample size: with jR 1 j = 1000 and jR 2 j = 4, the prediction is still determined by R 2 due to its speci city.
If John is not a typical white-collar worker (i.e., f 2 < 1), R 2 's con dence is smaller than c 2 c 4 , so it may need a bigger n for R 2 to be dominant. Therefore, when NARS is selecting a reference class, several factors are balanced against one another, including speci city, t ypicality, sample size, and so on. It provides a generalization of the speci city p r i o r i t y principle, by taking more relevant factors into consideration.
NARS' approach is more general than the speci city p r i o r i t y principle in another way. The including of reference classes is only a special case for two judgments to be based on correlated evidence. It follows that the speci c priority principle is a special case of NARS' updating rule.
How about competing reference classes that do not involve correlated evidence? Let us say in the previous examples, R 1 is still for \male", but R 2 is changed for \smoker and white-collar worker". If the deduced judgments J 5 and J 6 are not based on correlated evidence in some other ways, the two judgments will be combined by the revision rule of NARS. Other things being equal, R 2 has a higher priority, since it matches better with John's properties. However, in this case a higher priority only means a higher weight in determining the frequency of the conclusion. The judgment from the other reference class is not ignored. In this situation, the reference class competing is solved not by choosing one of them, but by combining the two.
Let us see how NARS treats the famous \Nixon Diamond" 14]. Putting into the previous framework, in this problem we h a ve \Nixon" as A, \ Q u a k er" as R 1 , \Republican" as R 2 , a n d \Paci st" as Q. I t i s a l s o g i v en that J 1 , J 2 , and J 3 are positive, but J 4 is negative. By deduction, two con icting judgments J 5 (\Nixon is a paci st") and J 6 (\Nixon is not a paci st") can be derived as in the previous example.
Since we can assume the un-correlation of evidence of the judgments (R 1 and R 2 have n o k n o wn relation), J 5 and J 6 will be combined by the revision rule, and the result depends on the truth value of the premises.
1. If f 1 = f 2 , c 1 = c 2 , f 3 = 1 ; f 4 , a n d c 3 = c 4 , w e will get f 0 = 0 :5. That is, when the positive evidence and the negative evidence exactly balance with each other, the system is indi erent between a positive prediction and a negative prediction.
2. If c 1 > c 2 , and the other conditions as in (1), we w i l l g e t f 0 > 0:5. That is, when Nixon shares more property with Quaker, the system will put more weight on the conclusions suggested by the evidence about Quaker. (1), we w i l l g e t f 0 > 0:5. That is, when we h a ve stronger statistical data about Quaker, the system will put more weight on the conclusions suggested by the evidence about Quaker, too. In any situation, what NARS does is to combine the evidence from both sources. Even if \Quaker" is given a higher priority, the evidence provided by \Republican" still has its e ect on the result. On the other hand, this kind of con ict does not always (though sometimes it does) cause complete indi erence or ambiguity, as it does in non-monotonic logics 15].
Comparisons
Compared with non-monotonic logics and probability theory, the processing of the reference class problem in NARS has the following characteristics:
1. While still following the speci city p r i o r i t y principle, several factors, such as sample size and degree of membership, are taken into account to quantitatively determine the priority of a reference class, and all the factors are projected into a unique dimension, the weight o f evidence. 2. The speci city priority principle has been generalized into a \con dence priority principle" which will pick up a judgment with the highest con dence among the competing ones. The principle is applied when the competing judgments are supported by correlated evidence. As discussed above, speci city i s o n e w ay to get a high con dence, and inclusion relation between reference classes is one reason that causes evidence correlation. 3. When con icting judgments come from di erent sources, the revision rule is applied to combine them by summarizing the evidence. This operation in unavailable in non-monotonic logics and probability theory. Why cannot we do similar things in non-monotonic logics and probability theory? One of the major reasons is that the con dence (or identically, weight of evidence) measurement cannot be easily introduced there. From the view point of NARS, the con dence of all the default rules (in non-monotonic logics) and probability assignments (in probability theory) is 1, that is, they cannot be revised by accommodating its current e v aluation to new evidence.
Because in 16] w e h a ve already argued that revision cannot be done in a rst-order probability distribution, let us concentrate on non-monotonic logics here.
Non-monotonic logics are often referred as \defeasible logic", but actually what is defeasible are only the conclusions derived from the default rules, rather than the rules themselves. The rules are treated as conventions 12] , which are immune from empirical revision. As long as \Birds y" is a default rule, it remains to be valid no matter how m a n y birds found later cannot y.
To treat default rules as convention is possible and even desired in many situations. In communication between systems (human or computer), these conventions are often intentionally followed, and if we already have lots of evidence, or if we only study the judgment making of the system in a short period, the in uence of new evidence can be ignored. In these situations, a binary logic is preferred for its simplicity and clarity. H o wever, such assumptions about environment are not always valid. Another thing we n e e d t o k eep in mind is: when treated as conventions, these rules become a priori to the system, and what the researchers concern about them is di erent from when they are treated as generalized experience. A s c o n ventions, their generation, acceptance, comparison, modi cation, and rejection are no longer determined, or even in uenced, by the experience of the system. Though it is correct to say that \normality" or \typicality" should not be interpreted in a pure frequentist way as \in most cases", we still have reason to argue that for many purposes, it is better to see them as closely related to empirical evidences, and have di erent degrees 5, 1 3 ] . Therefore, it makes sense, and often necessary, to measure the relations between the default rules and available evidence, which cannot be done in the framework of binary logic.
In summary, though non-monotonic logics and probability theory can be successfully used in many domains, their solution to the reference class (or multiple inheritance) problem is quite limited. Many related factors are ignored, and the problem is unsolvable when the involved reference classes do not include one another. For the more general problem, that is, how to revise beliefs, no solution is given. The problem is not one that can be solved by w orking harder in the two paradigms: as shown above, the solution involves factors that are ruled out by the fundamental de nitions of the two paradigms. NARS is not always better than non-monotonic logics and probability theory in all situations, but it is better when the available knowledge and resources are insu cient. Though still a simpli cation, it does consider more factors than the other two.
